Folk theorem

Results: 44



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31Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy Tim Roughgarden Department of Computer Science Stanford University 353 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305

Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy Tim Roughgarden Department of Computer Science Stanford University 353 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2012-05-15 15:01:36
32A FOLK THEOREM FOR COMPETING MECHANISMS MICHAEL PETERS UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA AND CRISTIAN TRONCOSO VALVERDE UNIVERSIDAD DIEGO PORTALES MANUEL RODR´IGUEZ Abstract. We provide a partial characterization of the se

A FOLK THEOREM FOR COMPETING MECHANISMS MICHAEL PETERS UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA AND CRISTIAN TRONCOSO VALVERDE UNIVERSIDAD DIEGO PORTALES MANUEL RODR´IGUEZ Abstract. We provide a partial characterization of the se

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Source URL: montoya.econ.ubc.ca

Language: English - Date: 2013-09-24 23:56:20
33No Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Costly Observations - a Draft∗ Ehud Lehrer†and Eilon Solan‡ September 22,

No Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Costly Observations - a Draft∗ Ehud Lehrer†and Eilon Solan‡ September 22,

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Source URL: www2.warwick.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2014-03-14 03:51:16
    34The Folk Theorem for Finitely Repeated Games with Mixed Strategies Olivier Gossner FebruaryRevised Version

    The Folk Theorem for Finitely Repeated Games with Mixed Strategies Olivier Gossner FebruaryRevised Version

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    Source URL: ogossner.free.fr

    Language: English - Date: 2005-10-17 11:52:48
      35The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information Drew Fudenberg; Eric Maskin Econometrica, Vol. 54, No. 3. (May, 1986), ppStable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=

      The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information Drew Fudenberg; Eric Maskin Econometrica, Vol. 54, No. 3. (May, 1986), ppStable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=

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      Source URL: scholar.harvard.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2013-02-05 00:14:30
      36THE FOLK THEOREM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH PRIVATE MONITORING Takuo Sugaya  A DISSERTATION

      THE FOLK THEOREM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH PRIVATE MONITORING Takuo Sugaya A DISSERTATION

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      Source URL: www.princeton.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2012-05-09 17:00:33
      37The Myth of the Folk Theorem Christian Borgs∗ Jennifer Chayes∗ Vahab Mirrokni∗

      The Myth of the Folk Theorem Christian Borgs∗ Jennifer Chayes∗ Vahab Mirrokni∗

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      Source URL: research.microsoft.com

      Language: English - Date: 2008-02-01 19:30:15
      38ERRATUM  Songzi Du pointed out to us that the proof of Lemma 5.5 in “The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information” (Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin, Econometrica[removed]is incorrect. The lemma is valid as stated

      ERRATUM Songzi Du pointed out to us that the proof of Lemma 5.5 in “The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information” (Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin, Econometrica[removed]is incorrect. The lemma is valid as stated

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      Source URL: www.dklevine.com

      Language: English - Date: 2008-10-26 17:24:19
        39The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games1 Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2

        The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games1 Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2

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        Source URL: www.dklevine.com

        Language: English - Date: 2004-06-17 14:23:12
        40The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games1 Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2

        The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games1 Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2

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        Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

        Language: English - Date: 2004-06-17 14:23:12